On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning by Mercier, Hugo
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Goldstone Research Unit Philosophy, Politics and Economics
2011
On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning
Hugo Mercier
University of Pennsylvania, hmercier@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone
Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Multicultural Psychology Commons, Social
Psychology Commons, and the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/6
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE)
cross-cultural differences, dual-process theory, contradiction, reasoning, argumentation
On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning
Abstract
According to the argumentative theory of reasoning, humans have evolved reasoning abilities (usually known
as ‘system 2’ or ‘analytic’ reasoning) for argumentative purposes. This implies that some reasoning skills
should be universals. Such a claim seems to be at odd with findings from cross-cultural research. First, a wealth
of research, following the work of Luria, has shown apparent difficulties for illiterate populations to solve
simple but abstract syllogisms. It can be shown, however, that once they are willing to accept the pragmatics of
the task, these participants can perform at or near ceiling. Second, historical, sociological and anthropological
research has been used to claim that some Eastern cultures have not developed argumentation. These claims
are the result of oversimplifications and of a selective view of the data. A closer looks reveals instead very
elaborate forms of argumentation, in Chinese culture particularly. Third, cross-cultural psychologists have
carried out an extensive research program aimed at showing that Easterners do not rely on the principle of
non-contradiction and that they use holistic rather than analytic thinking. A review of these experiments
shows that no qualitative difference emerges in the way Easterners and Westerners deal with argumentation
and that in the proper context both populations can easily have recourse to holistic or analytic thinking. It is
possible to conclude from this critical review that the reasoning skills involved in argumentation seem to be
universal even though they can be used in different ways in various cultural contexts.
Disciplines
Critical and Cultural Studies | Multicultural Psychology | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Social Psychology |
Social Psychology and Interaction
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/6
	  	  
On	  the	  universality	  of	  argumentative	  reasoning	  
	  
Hugo	  Mercier	  
Philosophy,	  Politics	  and	  Economics	  Program	  
University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  
313	  Cohen	  Hall	  
249	  South	  36th	  Street	  
Philadelphia,	  PA	  19104	  
hmercier@sas.upenn.edu	  	  	  
http://hugo.mercier.googlepages.com/	  
	  
To	  be	  published	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Cognition	  and	  Culture	  
2 
 
Abstract.	  According	  to	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning,	  humans	  have	  evolved	  reasoning	  
abilities	  (usually	  known	  as	  ‘system	  2’	  or	  ‘analytic’	  reasoning)	  for	  argumentative	  purposes.	  This	  implies	  
that	  some	  reasoning	  skills	  should	  be	  universals.	  Such	  a	  claim	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  odd	  with	  findings	  from	  
cross-­‐cultural	  research.	  First,	  a	  wealth	  of	  research,	  following	  the	  work	  of	  Luria,	  has	  shown	  apparent	  
difficulties	  for	  illiterate	  populations	  to	  solve	  simple	  but	  abstract	  syllogisms.	  It	  can	  be	  shown	  however	  
that	  once	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  pragmatics	  of	  the	  task,	  these	  participants	  can	  perform	  at	  or	  
near	  ceiling.	  Second,	  historical,	  sociological	  and	  anthropological	  research	  has	  been	  used	  to	  claim	  that	  
some	  Eastern	  cultures	  have	  not	  developed	  argumentation.	  These	  claims	  are	  the	  result	  of	  
oversimplifications	  and	  of	  a	  selective	  view	  of	  the	  data.	  A	  closer	  looks	  reveals	  instead	  very	  elaborate	  
forms	  of	  argumentation,	  in	  Chinese	  culture	  particularly.	  Third,	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists	  have	  
carried	  out	  an	  extensive	  research	  program	  aimed	  at	  showing	  that	  Easterners	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  
principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction	  and	  that	  they	  use	  holistic	  rather	  than	  analytic	  thinking.	  A	  review	  of	  
these	  experiments	  shows	  that	  no	  qualitative	  difference	  emerges	  in	  the	  way	  Easterners	  and	  
Westerners	  deal	  with	  argumentation	  and	  that	  in	  the	  proper	  context	  both	  populations	  can	  easily	  have	  
recourse	  to	  holistic	  or	  analytic	  thinking.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  conclude	  from	  this	  critical	  review	  that	  the	  
reasoning	  skills	  involved	  in	  argumentation	  seem	  to	  be	  universal	  even	  though	  they	  can	  be	  used	  in	  
different	  ways	  in	  various	  cultural	  contexts.	  
	  





It	  has	  become	  increasingly	  common	  in	  many	  areas	  of	  psychology	  to	  divide	  the	  mind	  in	  two	  broad	  
categories	  of	  processes.	  The	  first	  category	  comprises	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  typically	  fast,	  frugal,	  and	  
often	  unconscious.	  These	  intuitions	  (or	  system	  1	  reasoning)	  guide	  successfully	  most	  of	  our	  actions	  
and	  inferences	  (Bargh	  &	  Chartrand,	  1999).	  Mechanisms	  belonging	  to	  the	  second	  category—	  system	  2	  
reasoning,	  or	  reasoning	  proper—form	  a	  negative	  of	  the	  former:	  they	  are	  slower,	  require	  more	  effort,	  
and	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  conscious.	  Such	  a	  distinction	  was	  first	  developed	  within	  cognitive	  psychology	  (in	  
the	  fields	  of	  attention	  [Posner	  &	  Snyder,	  1975],	  memory	  [Schacter,	  1987]	  and	  learning	  [Berry	  &	  
Dienes,	  1993;	  Reber,	  1993])	  and	  social	  psychology	  (in	  the	  field	  of	  persuasion	  and	  attitude	  change	  
[Chaiken,	  Liberman,	  &	  Eagly,	  1989;	  Petty	  &	  Cacioppo,	  1986]).	  More	  recently	  it	  has	  invaded	  the	  whole	  
of	  social	  psychology	  (Chaiken	  &	  Trope,	  1999;	  Wilson,	  Lindsey,	  &	  Schooler,	  2000),	  as	  well	  as	  reasoning	  
(Evans	  &	  Over,	  1996;	  Sloman,	  1996;	  Stanovich,	  2004)	  and	  decision	  making	  (Kahneman,	  2003;	  
Kahneman	  &	  Frederick,	  2002,	  2005).	  Throughout	  this	  article,	  ‘reasoning’	  will	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  only	  to	  
what	  is	  usually	  called	  system	  2,	  analytic	  or	  rule-­‐based	  reasoning—a	  tiny	  portion	  of	  our	  mental	  
operations	  that	  has	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  work	  in	  psychology.	  
	   Distinctions	  drawn	  from	  such	  different	  fields	  as	  attention	  and	  stereotyping	  are	  bound	  not	  to	  
overlap	  perfectly.	  Even	  within	  the	  more	  restricted	  area	  of	  reasoning	  there	  are	  substantial	  differences	  
between	  competing	  dual	  process	  theories	  (Osman,	  2004).	  I	  will	  focus	  here	  on	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  
this	  distinction,	  that	  between	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  inferences	  (Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  2009).	  This	  
theory	  proposes	  a	  principled	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  categories	  of	  processes.	  Intuitive	  
inferences	  (or	  intuitions)	  are	  the	  most	  general	  type	  of	  inference:	  the	  cognitive	  act	  of	  producing	  an	  
informationally	  enriched	  output	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  given	  input.	  Such	  inferences	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
visual	  or	  motor	  systems	  (Kersten,	  Mamassian,	  &	  Yuille,	  2004;	  Wolpert	  &	  Kawato,	  1998)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  
higher	  cognition	  (mentalizing	  [Baron-­‐Cohen,	  1995]	  or	  naïve	  biology	  [Medin	  &	  Atran,	  2004]	  for	  
instance).	  When	  we	  draw	  such	  inferences,	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  have	  led	  us	  to	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produce	  a	  given	  output.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  reflective	  inferences	  (or	  reasoning)	  are	  characterized	  by	  
the	  attention	  they	  pay	  to	  reasons.	  More	  precisely,	  reflective	  inferences	  are	  based	  on	  an	  examination	  
of	  reasons	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  warrant	  accepting	  or	  rejecting	  a	  given	  conclusion—
they	  are	  thus	  a	  special	  type	  of	  metarepresentational	  mechanism	  (Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  2009;	  Sperber,	  
2000).	  For	  instance,	  when	  we	  ponder	  about	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  a	  given	  decision	  or	  conclusion,	  we	  
are	  using	  reflective	  inferences:	  once	  our	  mind	  is	  set,	  we	  can	  give	  an	  explicit	  and	  accurate	  account	  of	  
the	  reasons	  that	  have	  led	  us	  to	  this	  decision	  or	  conclusion.	  
Here	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  delve	  on	  the	  precise	  differences	  and	  commonalities	  between	  this	  
proposal	  and	  other	  dual	  process	  theories,	  but	  one	  of	  its	  most	  original	  facets	  needs	  to	  be	  emphasized.	  
The	  distinction	  between	  intuitive	  and	  reflective	  inferences	  comes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  
argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  that	  bears	  on	  the	  function	  of	  reasoning	  (Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  In	  
press;	  Sperber,	  2000,	  2001).	  Other	  dual	  process	  theories	  of	  reasoning	  share	  a	  ‘Cartesian	  assumption’	  
that	  reasoning	  evolved	  mostly	  for	  individual	  purposes:	  reasoning	  should	  help	  us	  create	  better	  beliefs,	  
reach	  knowledge,	  and	  make	  sounder	  decisions.	  Pointing	  out	  several	  flaws	  in	  this	  assumption,	  the	  
argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  suggests	  instead	  that	  reasoning	  is	  a	  profoundly	  social	  mechanism	  
whose	  function	  is	  to	  find	  and	  evaluate	  arguments	  so	  as	  to	  convince	  other	  people	  and	  be	  convinced	  
only	  when	  it	  is	  appropriate.	  The	  precise	  evolutionary	  rationale	  for	  this	  hypothesis	  need	  not	  concern	  
us	  here	  (see	  the	  above	  references),	  and	  I	  will	  only	  skim	  over	  some	  of	  the	  empirical	  support	  that	  can	  
be	  gathered	  in	  its	  favor	  (see	  Mercier,	  Submitted;	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  In	  press	  for	  a	  full	  account).	  This	  
hypothesis	  successfully	  predicts	  the	  following	  (tentative)	  observations:	  (i)	  people	  are	  good	  at	  arguing;	  
(ii)	  people	  reason	  better	  in	  argumentative	  contexts;	  (iii)	  reasoning	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  robust	  and	  
prevalent	  confirmation	  bias	  (a	  very	  useful	  feature	  in	  a	  debate	  but	  a	  terrible	  flaw	  for	  a	  prop	  of	  
individual	  cognition);	  (iv)	  when	  reasoning	  is	  used	  in	  decision	  making,	  it	  drives	  towards	  decisions	  that	  
are	  easy	  to	  justify	  but	  not	  necessarily	  better	  otherwise.	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   According	  to	  this	  theory	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  selection	  (such	  as	  
sexual	  selection	  or	  frequency	  dependant	  selection)	  to	  have	  had	  strong	  effects	  on	  the	  shaping	  of	  our	  
reasoning	  skills.	  This	  implies	  that	  these	  abilities	  should	  be	  shared	  by	  all	  (non	  pathological)	  human	  
populations	  (Tooby	  &	  Cosmides,	  1990).	  The	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  making	  such	  
universal	  claims.	  Other	  dual	  process	  theories	  also	  claim	  that	  our	  (system	  2)	  reasoning	  abilities	  are	  the	  
result	  of	  evolution	  and	  are	  therefore	  expected	  to	  be	  universal.	  This	  may	  cause	  many	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  
psychologist	  to	  cringe.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  most	  of	  the	  studies	  cited	  as	  supporting	  the	  argumentative	  
theory	  of	  reasoning	  (or,	  more	  generally,	  dual	  process	  theories)	  have	  been	  conducted	  among	  
Westerners	  or,	  as	  Henrich	  and	  colleagues	  put	  it,	  among	  WEIRD	  people—individuals	  from	  Western,	  
Educated,	  Individualistic,	  Rich,	  Democratic	  societies	  (Henrich,	  Heine,	  &	  Norenzayan,	  In	  press).	  
Henrich	  et	  al.	  point	  out	  that	  the—sometimes	  implicit—claims	  of	  universality	  for	  psychological	  traits	  
are	  often	  based	  on	  samples	  only	  drawn	  from	  such	  populations.	  Cross-­‐cultural	  investigations	  have	  
revealed	  however	  that	  in	  a	  disquieting	  number	  of	  cases	  the	  results	  obtained	  in	  these	  WEIRD	  
populations	  lie	  at	  one	  extreme	  of	  the	  distribution:	  many	  claims	  of	  universality	  have	  been	  made	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  what	  could	  be	  deemed	  an	  outlier.	  Reasoning	  and	  argumentation	  may	  be	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  
Is	  it	  not	  possible	  that	  those	  who	  advanced	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  were	  unduly	  
influenced	  by	  a	  culture	  (French	  academia)	  that	  encourages	  debate	  and	  contradictory	  discussion?	  
More	  to	  the	  point,	  the	  American	  undergraduates	  who	  form	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  subject	  pool	  also	  
belong	  to	  a	  culture	  in	  which	  debate	  is	  generally	  cast	  in	  a	  very	  positive	  light.	  Some	  researchers	  think	  
that	  at	  least	  a	  modicum	  of	  formal	  training	  is	  being	  necessary	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  basic	  reasoning	  
skills	  (Braine,	  1990;	  Scribner,	  1977).	  Others	  claim	  that	  whole	  cultures	  spurn	  debate	  that	  threatens	  
social	  harmony,	  favoring	  more	  conciliatory	  ways	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  (see	  the	  multiple	  references	  in	  
section	  3).	  If	  these	  claims	  were	  to	  be	  borne	  out,	  they	  would	  spell	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  argumentative	  
theory	  of	  reasoning.	  	  
	   This	  article	  aims	  at	  showing	  that	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  can	  survive	  these	  
attacks	  unscathed.	  Au	  contraire,	  it	  stands	  in	  a	  good	  position	  to	  encompass	  different	  ‘styles	  of	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thought’	  as	  it	  distances	  itself	  from	  the	  Western	  emphasis	  on	  abstract,	  deductive	  reasoning.	  The	  first	  
objection	  to	  be	  tackled	  will	  be	  that	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  schooling.	  Recent	  work	  will	  be	  reviewed	  
showing	  that	  modest	  pragmatic	  modifications	  make	  decontextualized	  (or	  abstract)	  reasoning	  much	  
easier	  for	  the	  illiterate	  populations	  who	  are	  often	  claimed	  to	  lack	  this	  ability.	  I	  will	  also	  provide	  some	  
preliminary	  anthropological	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  idea	  that	  argumentation	  can	  be	  efficient	  even	  
when	  some	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  linguistic	  tools	  associated	  with	  it	  are	  lacking.	  The	  second	  source	  of	  
criticism	  to	  be	  addressed	  comes	  from	  characterizations	  of	  Easterners	  as	  lacking	  argumentation	  
(Becker,	  1986).	  According	  to	  several	  anthropologists,	  linguists,	  sociologists	  and	  historians,	  several	  
factors	  concur	  to	  prevent	  Easterners	  from	  effectively	  using	  argumentation.	  The	  two	  main	  factors	  are	  
languages	  that	  render	  the	  expression	  of	  logical	  thought	  hard	  or	  even	  impossible	  and	  dogmas	  very	  
inimical	  to	  debate	  in	  any	  form.	  The	  most	  extreme	  forms	  of	  these	  views	  may	  not	  be	  fashionable	  
anymore,	  but	  run	  down	  versions	  are	  still	  widely	  influential,	  making	  their	  rebuttal	  worthwhile.	  	  
Among	  the	  people	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  such	  views	  are	  several	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists	  
who	  have	  aimed	  at	  a	  very	  ambitious	  comparison	  of	  Western	  and	  Eastern	  minds	  (Nisbett,	  2003;	  
Nisbett,	  Peng,	  Choi,	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2001).	  Several	  of	  their	  conclusions,	  based	  on	  a	  rich	  set	  of	  
experiments,	  may	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  argumentative	  theory.	  Easterners	  are	  supposed	  to	  have	  
little	  use	  for	  a	  principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction,	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  of	  argumentation	  (Peng	  &	  
Nisbett,	  1999).	  Their	  ‘Holistic’	  style	  of	  thinking	  is	  “associative,	  and	  its	  computations	  reflect	  similarity	  
and	  contiguity”,	  it	  relies	  “on	  experience-­‐based	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  on	  abstract	  logic”	  (Nisbett	  et	  
al.,	  2001,	  p.	  293).	  Such	  traits	  are	  much	  less	  conducive	  to	  good	  argumentation	  than	  the	  Western	  
‘analytic’	  thinking	  that	  	  “rest[s]	  in	  part	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  decontextualizing	  structure	  from	  content,	  
the	  use	  of	  formal	  logic,	  and	  avoidance	  of	  contradiction”	  (Nisbett	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  p.	  293).	  The	  last	  part	  of	  
this	  article	  will	  be	  dedicated	  to	  this	  strand	  of	  research,	  partly	  as	  a	  critique,	  partly	  as	  a	  tentative	  
reinterpretation,	  trying	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  commonalities	  and	  differences	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  
argumentative	  contexts.	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2	  Differences	  introduced	  by	  schooling	  
The	  domain	  of	  reasoning	  has	  been	  of	  long	  standing	  interest	  to	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists.	  Some	  of	  
the	  first	  studies	  were	  sparked	  in	  reaction	  to	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  famous	  description	  of	  the	  ‘prelogical	  
mentality’	  (Levy-­‐Bruhl,	  1910).	  Up	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  many	  missionaries	  and	  adventurers	  
reported	  a	  total	  lack	  of	  understanding	  (and	  interest)	  among	  native	  populations	  for	  any	  ‘abstract’	  
thought.	  Lévy-­‐Brulh	  tries	  to	  fight	  the	  conclusion	  that	  this	  apparent	  limitation	  is	  due	  to	  “the	  
feebleness	  or	  torpidity	  of	  their	  mind”	  (Levy-­‐Bruhl,	  1910,	  p.32).	  Instead,	  he	  delves	  on	  the	  numerous	  
observations	  that	  the	  very	  same	  native	  who	  seem	  reticent	  to	  engage	  in	  abstract	  thought	  are	  very	  
much	  at	  ease	  in	  more	  pragmatic	  matters	  to	  conclude	  that	  they	  must	  be	  endowed	  with	  profoundly	  
different	  reasoning	  abilities.	  If	  this	  is	  certainly	  a	  step	  forward,	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  view	  of	  the	  ‘primitive	  
mentality’	  is	  still	  somewhat	  pejorative,	  inasmuch	  as	  this	  mentality	  is	  “uncultivated	  in	  following	  a	  
chain	  of	  reasoning	  which	  is	  in	  the	  slightest	  degree	  abstract”	  (p.	  22),	  and	  “almost	  exclusively	  concrete	  
by	  nature”	  (p.433).	  	  
Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  work	  sparked	  an	  important	  reaction,	  mostly	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  anthropological	  
world	  (Boas,	  1938;	  Rivers,	  1926,	  see	  Leroy,	  1927	  for	  a	  French	  reaction).	  By	  bringing	  new	  evidence	  to	  
the	  fore,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  reinterpreting	  some	  of	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  own	  data,	  these	  scholars	  claimed	  that	  
native	  populations	  everywhere	  could	  respect	  the	  same	  logical	  laws	  as	  ‘civilized’	  people.	  That	  was	  the	  
state	  of	  the	  art	  when	  Luria	  famously	  decided	  to	  investigate	  experimentally	  the	  psychological	  
mechanisms	  of	  illiterate	  populations	  living	  in	  remote	  regions	  of	  Uzbekistan.	  While	  this	  tends	  to	  be	  
overseen	  by	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists,	  it	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  Luria’s	  objective	  was,	  in	  part,	  to	  
rebut	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  critiques	  and	  to	  show	  that	  “higher	  cognitive	  activities	  remain	  sociohistorical	  in	  
nature”	  (Luria,	  1976,	  p.8).	  It	  is	  to	  Luria’s	  results,	  and	  the	  research	  program	  they	  have	  generated,	  that	  
we	  now	  turn.	  
8 
 
Luria’s	  experiment	  on	  deductive	  reasoning	  used	  syllogisms	  such	  as	  “In	  the	  Far	  North,	  where	  
there	  is	  snow,	  all	  bears	  are	  white.	  Novaya	  Zemla	  is	  in	  the	  Far	  North.	  What	  colors	  are	  bears	  there?”	  
(Luria,	  1976,	  p.107).	  Among	  peasant,	  illiterate	  populations	  performance	  on	  such	  problem	  was	  very	  
poor:	  under	  30%	  of	  the	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  draw	  the	  apparently	  trivial	  conclusion.	  Using	  the	  
same	  methodology,	  similar	  results	  were	  subsequently	  obtained	  by	  teams	  of	  researchers	  working	  in	  
other	  illiterate	  populations	  in	  Africa	  and	  Central	  America	  (Cole,	  Gay,	  Glick,	  &	  Sharp,	  1971;	  Scribner,	  
1975,	  1977;	  Sharp	  &	  Cole,	  1975).	  In	  all	  cases,	  comparisons	  were	  drawn	  with	  literate	  populations	  
belonging	  to	  the	  same	  culture.	  For	  instance,	  Luria	  would	  pick	  younger	  participants	  who	  had	  just	  
started	  school	  and	  observe	  perfect	  performances	  on	  the	  same	  problems	  (Luria,	  1976,	  p.	  116,	  see	  the	  
above	  references	  as	  well).	  This	  led	  him	  and	  his	  followers	  to	  conclude	  that	  schooling	  was	  both	  
necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	  enable	  the	  development	  of	  abstract	  reasoning.	  It	  is	  possible	  however	  to	  
offer	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  their,	  admittedly	  very	  robust,	  findings	  (for	  related	  proposals,	  see	  
Hamill,	  1990;	  Hutchins,	  1980).	  
	   First	  it	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  difficulties	  hardly	  come	  from	  reasoning—the	  reflective	  
inference	  from	  premises	  to	  conclusion—itself.	  Starting	  with	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl,	  protagonists	  in	  this	  debate	  
have	  been	  unanimous	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  natives’	  ability	  to	  reason	  on	  familiar,	  interesting	  
problems.	  This	  point	  has	  been	  driven	  home	  experimentally	  by	  the	  results	  of	  Luria,	  Scribner,	  Cole,	  
Hamill	  and	  others.	  Hamill,	  for	  instance,	  observed	  perfect	  performances	  for	  his	  participants	  (illiterate	  
Native	  Americans)	  on	  a	  large	  number	  of	  syllogisms	  using	  familiar	  content	  (Hamill,	  1990).	  Given	  that	  
participants	  are	  able	  to	  draw	  an	  inference	  when	  they	  believe	  the	  premises	  to	  be	  true,	  but	  not	  when	  
they	  have	  to	  temporarily	  assume	  them	  to	  be	  true,	  the	  difficulty	  has	  to	  reside	  in	  this	  extra	  step	  of	  
abstraction.	  The	  question	  then	  is:	  Do	  they	  not	  perform	  this	  extra	  step	  for	  lack	  of	  ability	  or	  because	  
they	  are	  unwilling	  to	  do	  so?	  After	  all,	  why	  should	  they	  accept,	  however	  temporarily,	  everything	  the	  
experimenter	  is	  saying?	  Used	  that	  we	  are	  to	  empty	  school	  exercises,	  we	  take	  for	  granted	  something	  
that	  is,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  utterly	  strange.	  Creating	  random	  facts	  out	  of	  the	  blue	  and	  trying	  to	  draw	  
9 
 
inferences	  from	  them	  is	  not	  what	  you	  would	  otherwise	  expect	  of	  a	  rational	  individual1.	  Reasoning	  is	  
costly	  and	  tiring,	  and	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  other	  things	  to	  do	  with	  one’s	  mind.	  Outside	  of	  a	  specific	  
institutional	  context,	  we	  tend	  to	  see	  anyone	  intensely	  engaging	  in	  such	  activities	  as,	  well,	  slightly	  
deranged	  (a	  common	  popular	  perception	  of	  academics).	  Moreover,	  by	  accepting—however	  
temporarily—something	  that	  has	  no	  reasonable	  grounding,	  these	  participants	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  
perceived	  as	  gullible2.	  	  
	   Several	  results	  support	  the	  idea	  the	  poor	  performances	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  
participants	  to	  accept	  random,	  unfamiliar	  premises	  as	  true	  and	  that,	  once	  they	  do	  so,	  their	  reasoning	  
is	  very	  felicitous.	  First,	  both	  Luria	  and	  Scribner	  tested	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  syllogisms.	  The	  
vast	  majority	  of	  the	  participants	  could	  not	  accurately	  recall	  the	  two	  premises	  (Luria,	  1976,	  p.	  103ff;	  
Scribner,	  1975,	  p.	  160ff).	  This	  shows	  that	  they	  were	  not	  ready	  to	  invest	  too	  much	  mental	  energy	  in	  
the	  precise	  game	  the	  experimenter	  wanted	  to	  play.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  when	  participants	  were	  
willing	  to	  consider	  the	  premises	  as	  true,	  their	  performances	  improved—sometimes	  dramatically.	  
Luria	  observed	  this	  phenomenon	  when	  participants	  prefaced	  their	  answers	  by	  “from	  your	  words	  I	  
can	  gather	  that”	  (Luria,	  1976,	  p.116).	  Scribner’s	  analyses	  are	  much	  more	  striking.	  Participants’	  
justifications	  for	  their	  answers	  were	  coded	  as	  either	  empirical	  (“I	  don’t	  know	  the	  man	  in	  person”)	  or	  
theoretical	  (using	  only	  the	  words	  of	  the	  experimenter,	  often	  prefaced	  by	  “if	  you	  say”	  for	  instance).	  A	  
theoretical	  justification	  implies	  a	  temporary	  acceptance	  of	  the	  premises.	  Looking	  at	  different	  
populations	  (Mayan	  and	  Vai),	  she	  observed	  that	  less	  than	  2	  percent	  of	  the	  wrong	  answers	  were	  
                                                
1	  The	  insistence	  on	  logical	  validity	  as	  being	  detached	  from	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  premises	  is	  something	  very	  peculiar	  
to	  our	  Greek	  heritage.	  In	  both	  Indian	  Buddhist	  logic	  (Matilal,	  1998)	  and	  its	  Chinese	  heir	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998),	  
arguments	  drawn	  from	  false	  premises	  would	  be	  invalid,	  and	  arguments	  without	  pertinent	  premises	  would	  be	  
“quite	  out	  of	  place”	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  405).	  	  
2	  As	  a	  side	  note,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  notice	  that	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl	  himself	  partly	  based	  his	  evaluation	  of	  the	  “primitive’s	  
distaste	  for	  the	  discursive	  operations	  of	  thought”	  (Levy-­‐Bruhl,	  1910,	  p.	  15)	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  natives	  would	  not	  
accept	  conclusions	  based	  on	  reasoning	  from	  unfamiliar	  premises.	  This	  observation,	  in	  turn,	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  
reports	  of	  Jesuit	  missionaries	  depressed	  by	  their	  would-­‐be	  flock’s	  unwillingness	  to	  accept	  the	  message	  of	  the	  
Gospels.	  One	  of	  them	  lamented	  that	  the	  “truths	  of	  the	  Gospel	  would	  not	  have	  seemed	  admissible	  to	  them	  had	  
they	  been	  founded	  on	  reason	  and	  good	  sense	  alone”	  (quoted	  in	  ibid,	  p.	  21).	  Another	  had	  to	  put	  up	  with	  a	  
pigheaded	  recalcitrance	  to	  accept	  invisible	  things:	  “‘Can	  the	  God	  of	  the	  white	  men	  be	  seen	  by	  our	  eyes?	  ...	  and	  
if	  Morimo	  (God)	  is	  absolutely	  invisible,	  how	  can	  a	  reasonable	  being	  worship	  a	  hidden	  thing?’”	  (quoted	  in	  ibid,	  p.	  
23).	  Who	  was	  being	  irrational,	  the	  Jesuits	  or	  the	  natives,	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear.	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associated	  with	  theoretical	  justifications	  (!)	  (Scribner,	  1977,	  p.	  489).	  As	  soon	  as	  participants	  gave	  
theoretical	  justifications,	  they	  got	  the	  problems	  right.	  However,	  such	  justifications	  were	  typically	  
given	  by	  less	  than	  a	  third	  of	  the	  participants,	  which	  explains	  the	  poor	  overall	  performance.	  Still,	  this	  
shows	  conclusively	  that	  reasoning	  itself	  is	  far	  from	  being	  faulty,	  even	  when	  it	  bears	  on	  unfamiliar	  
premises.	  	  
	   Finally,	  Paul	  Harris	  and	  his	  collaborators	  have	  conducted	  a	  fascinating	  series	  of	  experiment	  
showing	  that	  some	  contexts	  make	  participants	  more	  willing	  to	  temporarily	  accept	  unfamiliar	  
premises.	  First,	  they	  showed	  that	  children	  (as	  young	  as	  4-­‐years-­‐old)	  showed	  more	  willingness	  to	  
reason	  on	  unfamiliar	  premises	  when	  they	  were	  put	  in	  a	  clearly	  imaginary	  context	  (another	  planet,	  a	  
story)	  (Dias	  &	  Harris,	  1988,	  1990;	  Leevers	  &	  Harris,	  1999).	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  they	  also	  adapted	  their	  
methodology	  to	  work	  with	  illiterate	  adults	  from	  Recife,	  Brazil	  (Dias,	  Roazzi,	  &	  Harris,	  2005).	  Again,	  
they	  observed	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  reason	  on	  unfamiliar	  premises,	  or	  even	  with	  
premises	  contrary	  to	  experience,	  when	  they	  were	  framed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘another	  planet’.	  This	  
manipulation	  provided	  a	  context	  that	  the	  participants	  might	  find	  more	  entertaining,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
safeguard	  against	  saying	  anything	  ungrounded	  about	  the	  real	  world.	  
	   From	  these	  results	  we	  can	  conclude	  the	  following.	  First,	  in	  every	  population	  studied,	  some	  
participants	  are	  spontaneously	  willing	  to	  go	  along	  with	  the	  experimenter’s	  game	  (“there	  are	  minds	  
among	  them	  quite	  as	  capable	  of	  scientific	  thought	  as	  those	  of	  Europeans”,	  as	  a	  Jesuit	  missionary	  
would	  put	  it,	  cited	  in	  Levy-­‐Bruhl,	  1910,	  p.22).	  Second,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  more	  participants	  behave	  
in	  that	  manner	  simply	  by	  framing	  the	  problems	  in	  a	  more	  felicitous	  context.	  And,	  third,	  when	  they	  
are	  willing	  to	  play	  the	  game,	  participants	  perform	  at	  ceiling.	  This	  should	  put	  to	  rest	  the	  claims	  that	  
natives	  and/or	  illiterates	  are	  incapable	  of	  abstract	  thought.	  
	   Before	  turning	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  alleged	  ‘lack	  of	  argumentation	  in	  the	  Far-­‐East’	  several	  
anecdotes	  are	  worth	  mentioning	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  reasoning	  and	  argumentation.	  The	  theory	  
defended	  here	  predicts	  that	  people	  should	  be	  good	  at	  arguing	  and	  that	  they	  should	  reason	  more	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effectively	  in	  argumentative	  contexts.	  When	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  experiments	  reported	  above	  had	  
to	  defend	  their	  answers	  to	  the	  experimenter,	  the	  “chain	  of	  reasoning	  leading	  to	  the	  answer	  …	  was	  
found	  to	  follow	  logically	  from	  the	  evidence	  used	  by	  the	  subject”	  (Scribner,	  1977,	  p.	  488).	  One	  of	  
Luria’s	  participants	  had	  to	  use	  analogical	  reasoning	  (“our	  tsar	  isn’t	  like	  yours”,	  Luria,	  1976,	  p.	  109)	  to	  
explain	  to	  this	  hapless	  foreigner	  why	  he	  could	  not	  speak	  of	  places	  he	  did	  not	  know.	  Moreover,	  when	  
the	  very	  same	  people	  were	  observed	  in	  more	  argumentative	  contexts—such	  as	  a	  law	  court—they	  
displayed	  very	  skilful	  reasoning	  with,	  in	  one	  example,	  “explicit	  use	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  argument	  and	  
juxtaposition	  of	  contradictory	  instances”	  (Cole	  et	  al.,	  1971,	  p.	  182,	  see	  also	  Hutchins,	  1980)3.	  Finally,	  
when	  Cole	  and	  colleagues	  gave	  groups	  the	  syllogisms	  that	  prove	  so	  difficult	  for	  individuals,	  they	  
noted	  that	  “when	  engaged	  in	  group	  discussion,	  there	  was	  no	  difficulty	  in	  responding	  to	  such	  oral	  
syllogisms”	  (Cole	  et	  al.,	  1971,	  p.	  186).	  More	  generally,	  small	  human	  groups	  all	  over	  the	  planet	  have	  
recourse	  to	  argumentation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  group	  decision	  making	  (Boehm,	  1996)	  and	  of	  trials	  and	  
judicial	  decisions	  (see	  Nader	  &	  Todd,	  1978	  for	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  field	  of	  legal	  anthropology),	  so	  
these	  conclusions	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  to	  most	  anthropologists.	  
3	  East	  Asian	  attitude	  towards	  argumentation	  
After	  the	  problems	  illiterates	  were	  supposed	  to	  face	  with	  abstract	  thought,	  the	  second	  issue	  that	  will	  
be	  tackled	  is	  that	  of	  the	  “lack	  of	  argumentation	  and	  debate	  in	  the	  Far-­‐East”	  (Becker,	  1986).	  There	  is	  a	  
long	  standing	  claim	  that	  “the	  use	  of	  public	  speaking	  for	  the	  debating	  of	  conflicting	  viewpoints	  …	  has	  
generally	  been	  unacceptable	  in	  the	  Orient”	  (Becker,	  1986,	  p.	  76).	  Partly	  based	  on	  this	  claim,	  Richard	  
Nisbett	  and	  his	  collaborators	  have	  developed	  a	  rich	  research	  program	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychology	  
that	  aims	  at	  showing,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  Easterners	  and	  Westerners	  reason	  in	  “qualitatively	  different	  
ways”	  (Nisbett	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  p.	  305).	  The	  next	  section	  will	  be	  dedicated	  to	  some	  of	  their	  empirical	  
results.	  But	  before	  this,	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  question	  some	  of	  the	  sources	  they	  rely	  on.	  	  
                                                
3	  Interestingly,	  their	  reasoning	  shares	  the	  flaws	  of	  ours	  as	  well	  as	  its	  brilliance.	  In	  the	  same	  example	  of	  court	  
law	  one	  of	  the	  participant	  presented	  a	  very	  selective	  version	  of	  the	  evidence	  to	  support	  her	  contention,	  
displaying	  a	  strong	  confirmation	  bias	  (which	  is	  not	  that	  surprising	  given	  the	  context).	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   Here	  is	  a	  fairly	  representative	  claim	  emerging	  from	  this	  literature:	  “the	  Chinese	  and	  people	  
from	  other	  Eastern	  Asian	  cultures	  are	  less	  likely	  than	  Westerners	  to	  engage	  in	  debates	  and	  formal	  
argumentation”	  (Peng	  &	  Nisbett,	  1999,	  p.	  747).	  Such	  an	  assertion	  can	  be	  read	  at	  different	  levels.	  
Peng	  and	  Nisbett	  might	  be	  talking	  about	  the	  refined,	  formalized,	  institutional	  process	  of	  
argumentation	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  courts	  or	  parliaments.	  This	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  use	  of	  
arguments	  in	  more	  casual	  circumstances—at	  home,	  at	  work,	  among	  friends.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  truth	  of	  
this	  statement	  is	  not	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  humans	  are	  endowed	  with	  an	  evolved	  ability	  
for	  argumentation.	  That	  some	  cultures	  lack	  formal	  mathematics	  is	  no	  argument	  against	  their	  
member	  possessing	  naive	  mathematical	  skills	  (Dehaene,	  1999).	  But	  in	  the	  course	  of	  defending	  this	  
claim	  its	  partisans	  have	  recourse	  to	  arguments	  that	  have	  much	  broader	  consequences,	  entailing	  that	  
East-­‐Asians	  should	  have	  difficulties	  with	  argumentation	  more	  generally,	  or	  even	  that	  they	  have	  “no	  
standards	  for	  matching	  propositions	  with	  other	  propositions	  (coherence)	  or	  with	  other	  states	  of	  
affairs	  in	  the	  world	  (‘correspondence	  tests	  of	  truth’)”	  (Becker,	  1986,	  p.	  78).	  If	  a	  large	  swath	  of	  human	  
population	  was	  truly	  deprived	  of	  skills	  that	  are	  so	  fundamentals	  to	  any	  argumentative	  activity	  that	  
would	  certainly	  prove	  fatal	  for	  the	  theory	  defended	  here.	  One	  of	  the	  sources	  for	  these	  strong	  claims	  
is	  linguistic	  analysis.	  
3.1	  East-­‐Asian	  languages	  and	  logical	  thought	  
In	  his	  widely	  cited	  book,	  Hajime	  Nakamura	  chastises	  the	  Chinese	  and	  the	  Japanese	  languages	  for	  
their	  vagueness	  and	  the	  obstacle	  it	  sets	  to	  “expressing	  logical	  conceptions”	  (Nakamura,	  1964,	  p.	  534,	  
see	  also	  Logan,	  1986)4.	  Later,	  Alfred	  Bloom	  put	  forward	  a	  related	  but	  much	  more	  restricted	  claim	  
that	  the	  Chinese	  language	  could	  not	  express	  counterfactuals	  and	  that,	  as	  a	  result,	  Chinese	  people	  
had	  the	  greatest	  difficulties	  understanding	  such	  statements	  (Bloom,	  1981	  see	  also	  Hall	  &	  Ames,	  
1987).	  The	  most	  comprehensive	  rebuttal	  of	  these	  claims	  is	  maybe	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Christoph	  
                                                
4	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Nakamura	  started	  his	  comparative	  project	  right	  after	  Japan’s	  defeat	  in	  World	  War	  
II	  (Nakamura,	  1964,	  p.	  xiii),	  at	  a	  time	  when	  there	  was	  a “	  strong	  inclination	  to	  view	  "Asian"	  conditions	  critically	  
in	  comparison	  with	  a	  "Western"	  ideal”	  (Oguma,	  2007).	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Harbsmeier	  (see	  Harbsmeier,	  1981	  for	  the	  counterfactuals).	  In	  the	  volume	  of	  Science	  and	  Civilisation	  
in	  China	  dedicated	  to	  language	  and	  logic	  he	  shows	  convincingly	  that	  all	  the	  logical	  relations	  required	  
for	  logic	  were	  available	  in	  classical	  Chinese	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998).	  Indeed,	  some	  aspects	  of	  classical	  
Chinese	  were	  more	  ‘logical’	  than	  its	  Greek	  counterpart	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  113).	  The	  expressive	  
power	  of	  Chinese	  was	  not	  lost	  over	  time:	  in	  1631,	  a	  Chinese	  scholar,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  Jesuit	  
missionary,	  published	  a	  translation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  Categories,	  the	  epitome	  of	  Greek	  logical	  thinking5	  
(see	  the	  fascinating	  analysis	  of	  this	  translation	  in	  Robert	  Wardy’s	  Aristotle	  in	  China	  [2000]).	  Without	  
denying	  that	  languages	  can	  have	  interesting	  effects	  on	  thought,	  they	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  set	  stringent	  
boundaries:	  “language	  in	  no	  deus	  ex	  machina	  to	  account	  for	  philosophy.	  Neither	  is	  eternally	  fixed;	  
both	  change,	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  intellectual	  community	  are	  what	  move	  a	  language	  into	  more	  
abstract	  and	  refined	  terms”	  (Collins,	  1998,	  p.	  10).	  	  
That	  language	  itself	  is	  hardly	  an	  obstacle	  to	  argumentation	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  an	  extreme	  
example	  that	  takes	  us	  very	  far	  from	  ancient	  Chinese	  literature,	  towards	  the	  Amazonian	  forest.	  The	  
Pirahã	  are	  a	  small	  tribe	  in	  northern	  Brazil	  that	  has	  recently	  sparked	  a	  lot	  of	  interest	  among	  
psychologists,	  linguists	  and	  anthropologists.	  Dan	  Everett,	  a	  missionary	  turned	  linguist	  who	  has	  had	  
very	  extensive	  experience	  of	  life	  among	  the	  Pirahã	  claims	  that	  their	  language	  lacks	  words	  or	  markers	  
for	  conditionals,	  disjunctions,	  conjunctions,	  comparatives	  and	  quantifiers	  (Everett	  et	  al.,	  2005)6.	  
However,	  that	  does	  not	  stop	  them	  both	  from	  understanding	  arguments	  (Everett	  once	  had	  to	  argue	  
his	  way	  out	  of	  a	  potentially	  lethal	  situation,	  Everett,	  2008,	  p.	  64)	  and	  from	  frequently	  arguing	  
effectively	  with	  him	  or	  between	  themselves	  (Everett,	  2008;	  Everett	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  
Even	  if	  one	  accepts	  that	  language	  can	  hardly	  place	  any	  strong	  constraints	  on	  basic	  
argumentative	  skills,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  traditions	  never	  developed	  
                                                
5	  In	  which	  the	  word	  used	  to	  translate	  ‘logic’	  is	  ‘pien’,	  which	  can	  mean	  ‘to	  tell	  apart,	  to	  distinguish,	  to	  
discriminate’,	  and	  is	  a	  cognate	  of	  ‘pien’	  ‘to	  argue,	  to	  dispute’	  (Wardy,	  2000,	  p.	  99).	  
6	  He	  also	  claims	  that	  they	  have	  no	  true	  color	  terms	  or	  number	  terms	  (including	  ‘one’),	  and	  that	  their	  language	  
lacks	  recursion.	  Rather	  unsurprisingly,	  these	  claims	  have	  been	  widely	  debated	  (see	  Nevins,	  Pesetsky,	  &	  
Rodriguez,	  2007	  and	  Everett,	  In	  press	  for	  Everett’s	  answer)	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a	  taste	  for	  arguments	  and	  debates.	  If	  the	  reasons	  are	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  intrinsic	  linguistic	  limitations,	  
they	  may	  lie	  in	  more	  general	  social	  and	  cultural	  pressures.	  
3.2	  Socio-­‐cultural	  arguments	  
Scholars	  have	  noted	  that	  many	  Eastern	  doctrines	  hold	  an	  apparently	  bleak	  view	  of	  argumentation.	  
Thus	  one	  can	  read	  in	  the	  Analects	  that	  “The	  superior	  man	  is	  slow	  to	  speak	  but	  quick	  to	  act”,	  in	  the	  
Tao	  Te	  King	  that	  “A	  good	  man	  does	  not	  argue;	  he	  who	  argues	  is	  not	  a	  good	  man”,	  and	  Rinzai	  Zen	  
scorns	  “hell-­‐producing”	  eloquence	  (all	  three	  citation	  from	  Becker,	  1986,	  see	  Becker,	  1983	  and	  
Morrison,	  1972	  for	  Japan	  more	  specifically).	  There	  is	  no	  denying	  that	  such	  statements	  are	  recurrent	  
in	  this	  literature.	  But	  do	  they	  represent	  the	  only	  available	  point	  of	  view?	  And	  are	  people,	  including	  
their	  authors,	  abiding	  by	  these	  statements?	  The	  answer	  to	  both	  of	  these	  questions	  is	  a	  resounding	  
‘no’7.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  put	  the	  apparent	  rejection	  of	  debate	  and	  argumentation	  by	  Eastern	  doctrines	  in	  
perspective,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  point	  out	  the	  many	  similarities	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  attitudes	  
towards	  logic	  and	  argumentation.	  Geoffrey	  Lloyd	  has	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  the	  Chinese	  and	  the	  
Greek	  thoughts	  are	  strongly	  overlapping	  (Lloyd,	  1990,	  1996,	  2006,	  2007),	  and	  I	  will	  only	  give	  a	  few	  
illustrative	  examples	  here.	  Before	  China	  was	  unified	  by	  the	  Qin	  dynasty	  in	  the	  3rd	  century	  BCE,	  it	  was	  
composed	  of	  many	  states	  frequently	  at	  war	  with	  each	  other.	  During	  this	  so-­‐called	  Warring-­‐States	  
Period,	  that	  lasted	  more	  than	  two	  centuries,	  there	  was	  a	  “flourishing	  of	  contending	  schools	  [that]	  
bears	  witness	  to	  the	  social	  change	  and	  political	  turmoil	  of	  the	  time,	  the	  rise	  of	  liberal	  thinking,	  private	  
education,	  and	  wide	  circulation	  of	  books”	  (Chang,	  2007,	  p.	  87).	  Most	  interesting	  here	  is	  the	  Mohist	  
                                                
7	  Another	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Nisbett	  and	  his	  colleagues	  to	  explain	  the	  value	  placed	  on	  social	  harmony	  in	  
the	  East,	  and	  its	  supposed	  adverse	  consequences	  for	  argumentation,	  is	  that	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  required	  
agricultural	  work,	  there	  had	  to	  be	  strong	  cooperation	  (Nisbett	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  p.	  303).	  This,	  however,	  is	  probably	  
even	  truer	  of	  Sumer	  where	  the	  need	  for	  efficient,	  state	  controlled	  irrigation	  was	  extremely	  strong.	  But	  that	  did	  
not	  stop	  the	  Sumerians	  from	  creating	  a	  rich	  tradition	  of	  poem-­‐debates	  that	  could	  be	  quite	  subversive	  (Ponchia,	  
2007).	  Nisbett	  et	  al.	  also	  note	  that	  “the	  West	  during	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  was	  similar	  economically	  and	  socially	  to	  
ancient	  China	  in	  many	  ways”	  (p.	  295).	  But	  it	  is	  precisely	  during	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  that	  the	  tradition	  of	  debate	  (the	  
disputatio)	  and	  logic	  (within	  scholasticism)	  was	  rekindled	  in	  the	  West.	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school	  of	  thought.	  Founded	  by	  Mo	  Zi	  in	  the	  5th	  century	  BCE,	  this	  school	  was	  “relying	  heavily	  on	  
deductive	  patterns”	  made	  possible	  by	  “their	  strength	  in	  geometry,	  a	  firm	  understanding	  of	  class	  
inclusions	  and	  quantification,	  and	  an	  interest	  in	  science”	  (Jensen,	  1992,	  relying	  on	  Garrett,	  1983).	  
This	  “single	  small	  school”	  (Becker,	  1986,	  p.	  89)	  tends	  to	  be	  pushed	  under	  the	  Confucian	  rug	  but	  in	  
fact,	  “at	  its	  peak	  in	  the	  4th	  and	  3rd	  centuries	  B.C.,	  no	  school	  was	  more	  influential”	  (Fraser,	  2007).	  
Besides	  their	  content,	  there	  are	  remarkable	  historical	  parallels	  between	  the	  history	  of	  Mohist	  and	  
Greek	  logic.	  Both	  were	  created	  partly	  as	  a	  response	  to	  what	  they	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  ‘sophistry’	  of	  
their	  predecessor	  who	  could	  argue	  for	  both	  sides	  of	  every	  issue	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  114).	  And	  both	  
temporarily	  lost	  (admittedly	  for	  a	  longer	  time	  in	  China)	  their	  prominence	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  religious	  
and	  political	  changes	  (Huff,	  2003).	  While	  in	  China	  the	  first	  Qin	  emperor	  “is	  alleged	  to	  have	  
suppressed	  and	  to	  have	  attempted	  to	  burn	  all	  the	  books	  he	  could	  lay	  hands”	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  
its	  Legalist	  support	  (Lloyd,	  1990,	  p.110)8,	  around	  the	  Mediterranean	  Paul	  was	  preaching	  that	  “the	  
more	  they	  called	  themselves	  philosophers	  the	  more	  stupid	  they	  grew	  …	  they	  made	  nonsense	  out	  of	  
logic	  and	  their	  empty	  minds	  were	  darkened”	  (Romans	  1:20,21,	  quoted	  in	  Freeman,	  2002,	  p.120;	  see	  
Given,	  2001	  on	  Paul’s	  own	  skillful	  use	  of	  sometimes	  deceptive	  rhetoric)9.	  Even	  if	  other	  factors	  may	  
have	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  neglect	  of	  Mohism	  once	  its	  supporting	  institutions	  had	  crumbled,	  this	  very	  
destruction	  was	  caused	  by	  a	  political	  crackdown	  and	  not	  by	  Mohism’s	  lack	  of	  appeal10.	  
	   Another	  reason	  invoked	  by	  Chinese	  philosophers	  to	  reject	  the	  abstract	  mind	  games	  of	  
logicians	  was	  their	  apparent	  futility.	  Thus,	  Hsün	  Tzu	  chastises	  his	  predecessors	  who	  “love	  to	  sort	  out	  
strange	  theories	  and	  play	  around	  with	  abstruse	  expressions”	  (quoted	  in	  Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.348).	  A	  
cursory	  look	  at	  the	  famous	  white	  horse	  dialogue,	  for	  instance,	  makes	  one	  empathize	  with	  this	  
evaluation.	  Some	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  will	  be	  put	  forward	  by	  Francis	  Bacon	  and	  many	  others	  
                                                
8	  For	  all	  their	  supposed	  tolerance	  for	  debate,	  Athenians	  also	  knew	  that	  a	  good	  auto-­‐da-­‐fe	  could	  be	  fun,	  as	  
illustrated	  by	  their	  burning	  of	  Protagoras’	  books	  (Hussey,	  1972,	  p.	  116,	  cited	  in	  Billig,	  1996).	  	  
9	  A	  few	  centuries	  later,	  Augustine	  would	  chastises	  “the	  man	  with	  a	  reputation	  of	  eloquence”	  (Augustine,	  1991,	  
p.	  3),	  ironically	  with	  the	  help	  of	  “the	  full	  arsenal	  of	  Latin	  rhetorical	  devices”	  (McNeely	  &	  Wolverton,	  2008,	  p.	  
47).	  
10	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Muʿtazilah	  school	  within	  Islam,	  that	  most	  strongly	  engaged	  in	  the	  use	  of	  
reason	  and	  debates	  to	  understand	  the	  Qu’ran,	  is	  somewhat	  similar	  to	  the	  fate	  of	  Mohism	  (Huff,	  2003)	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against	  the	  excesses	  of	  scholasticism	  bear	  a	  strong	  resemblance	  to	  those	  of	  Hsün	  Tzu.	  Finally,	  
another	  interesting	  parallel	  is	  the	  relationship	  of	  logic	  to	  morality.	  That	  arguments	  can	  make	  people	  
stray	  from	  the	  good	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  reproaches	  formulated	  against	  argumentation	  by	  Chinese	  
thinkers	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  of	  many	  a	  religious	  thinker	  in	  the	  West).	  But	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  the	  wholesale	  
rejection	  of	  arguments	  or	  of	  logic;	  instead,	  the	  dominant	  attitude	  is	  that	  “logical	  argument	  is	  
considered	  as	  a	  handmaid	  of	  moral	  orthodoxy”	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  277),	  the	  very	  same	  view	  that	  
has	  been	  expounded	  by	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  Christian	  thinkers,	  from	  John	  to	  Aquinas,	  who	  
“viewed	  natural	  philosophy	  …	  as	  handmaiden	  to	  theology”	  (Grant,	  2001,	  p.	  184).	  	  
It	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  notice	  that	  some	  of	  the	  philosophical	  concepts	  that	  seem	  to	  negate	  the	  
possibility	  of	  discussion	  were	  often	  introduced	  for	  argumentative	  or	  even	  rhetorical	  purposes.	  Thus	  
Becker	  cites	  this	  anecdote	  as	  supporting	  a	  relativistic	  stance	  within	  Chinese	  thought:	  “In	  a	  classic	  
dialogue	  with	  his	  friend	  Hui,	  as	  they	  walked	  along	  a	  dam	  looking	  at	  the	  fish	  in	  the	  river,	  Chuang-­‐tzu	  
said,	  ‘The	  white	  fish	  swimming	  easily	  in	  the	  river	  are	  so	  happy!’	  Answering	  with	  Chuang’s	  own	  
relativistic	  logic	  that	  no	  one	  can	  know	  another’s	  mind,	  Hui	  responded:	  ‘You	  are	  not	  a	  fish.	  How	  do	  
you	  know	  its	  happiness?’	  To	  this,	  Chuang	  retorted	  again,	  ‘You	  are	  not	  I.	  How	  do	  you	  know	  that	  I	  do	  
not	  know?’”	  (W.	  T.	  Chan,	  1963,	  p.	  210,	  quoted	  in	  Becker,	  1986).	  While	  a	  relativistic	  stance	  may	  not	  
favor	  logical	  discussion	  at	  a	  reflective	  level,	  it	  clearly	  does	  not	  preclude	  its	  advocates	  from	  making	  
clever	  arguments.	  Moreover,	  Lloyd	  points	  out	  that	  this	  type	  of	  relativistic	  point	  of	  view,	  far	  from	  
being	  argumentatively	  innocuous,	  was	  sometimes	  used	  in	  “withering	  dialectical	  attacks	  on	  other	  
philosophers’	  claims	  to	  wisdom	  and	  in	  particular	  on	  any	  pretence	  at	  certainty”	  (Lloyd,	  1990,	  p.	  115).	  
	   Even	  though	  one	  can	  find	  many	  commonalities	  in	  the	  argumentative	  repertoires	  of	  ancient	  
Chinese	  and	  Greek	  cultures	  (see	  for	  instance	  Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  278ff)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  position	  
adopted	  towards	  debate	  at	  different	  points	  of	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  history,	  some	  differences	  remain	  
significant.	  Even	  the	  defenders	  of	  Chinese	  argumentation	  note	  that	  “argument	  from	  authority	  has	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been	  and	  is	  a	  dominant	  mode	  of	  argumentation	  in	  much	  of	  Asian	  discourse”	  (Jensen,	  1992)11	  and	  
that	  “logical	  argumentation	  was	  not	  the	  preferred	  way	  of	  justifying	  or	  supporting	  one’s	  thesis	  in	  
ancient	  China.	  What	  then	  was	  the	  preferred	  way	  of	  supporting	  one’s	  claims?	  It	  was	  through	  what	  
may	  be	  called	  paradigmatic	  arguments	  from	  historical	  examples”	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  267).	  Maybe	  
the	  most	  important	  difference	  was	  that	  the	  official	  rejection	  of	  debates	  and	  argumentation,	  mostly	  
by	  the	  Confucians,	  was	  much	  longer	  lasting	  than	  its	  Western,	  Christian	  counterpart.	  But	  to	  what	  
extent	  was	  this	  official	  rejection	  efficient	  in	  preventing	  debates	  from	  occurring?	  
	   It	  is	  well	  known	  in	  anthropology	  that	  people	  can	  hold	  seemingly	  strange	  attitudes	  but	  still	  
behave	  in	  a	  much	  more	  ‘normal’	  manner	  than	  would	  be	  predicted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  attitudes,	  as	  
if	  most	  of	  their	  inferences	  were	  effectively	  decoupled	  from	  their	  more	  reflective	  beliefs	  (Sperber,	  
1975,	  1997).	  Likewise,	  social	  psychologists	  have	  observed	  again	  and	  again	  surprisingly	  weak	  
correlations	  between	  attitude	  and	  behavior	  (Ajzen	  &	  Fishbein,	  2005).	  It	  is	  therefore	  very	  plausible	  to	  
expect	  that	  for	  all	  their	  maxims	  and	  precepts,	  Easterners	  will	  still	  be	  frequently	  seen	  sparring	  in	  
debates.	  	  
To	  support	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  draw	  both	  from	  intellectual	  history	  and	  from	  what	  we	  
can	  gather	  from	  the	  behavior	  of	  laypeople,	  but	  before	  doing	  so	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  point	  out	  an	  
important	  source	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  way	  debates	  have	  been	  reported	  in	  ancient	  Chinese	  literature.	  It	  has	  
been	  concluded	  from	  this	  literature	  that	  the	  “lack	  of	  a	  controversial	  spirit	  of	  dialogue	  in	  ancient	  
China	  is	  noteworthy”	  (Nakamura,	  1964,	  p.	  186).	  ‘Lack’	  is	  certainly	  too	  strong	  a	  word	  when	  “just	  about	  
every	  issue	  of	  policy	  and	  tactics	  could	  be	  and	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  heated	  argument”	  (Lloyd,	  2007,	  p.	  
10).	  But	  more	  importantly	  there	  is	  strong	  ground	  to	  expect	  that,	  given	  the	  scribal	  traditions	  in	  China,	  
most	  of	  the	  debates	  were	  not	  reported,	  only	  there	  results	  were:	  “If	  the	  writing	  culture	  encourages	  
                                                
11	  While	  in	  the	  West	  one	  can	  find,	  very	  early	  on,	  statements	  such	  as: “For	  every	  authority	  which	  is	  not	  upheld	  
by	  true	  reason	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  weak,	  whereas	  true	  reason	  is	  kept	  firm	  and	  immutable	  by	  her	  own	  powers	  and	  
does	  not	  require	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  the	  assent	  of	  any	  authority.”	  (Eriugena,	  867,	  Book	  1,	  chapter	  69).	  But	  a	  
few	  centuries	  later	  Eriugena’s	  books	  were	  to	  be	  burnt	  by	  order	  of	  the	  Pope,	  showing	  once	  again	  that	  this	  
depreciating	  stance	  towards	  authority	  was	  not	  exactly	  consensual	  in	  the	  West. 
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the	  summarizing	  and	  digesting	  of	  scientific	  results	  rather	  than	  the	  delineation	  of	  the	  intellectual	  path	  
by	  which	  they	  were	  achieved,	  then	  there	  is	  nothing	  objectively	  textual	  for	  the	  logician	  to	  pick	  up	  and	  
analyse	  in	  detail”	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  418).	  So	  any	  assessment	  of	  the	  role	  of	  argumentation	  and	  
debate	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  Chinese	  thought	  will	  sometimes	  have	  to	  proceed	  through	  a	  reconstruction	  
of	  the	  debates	  that	  must	  have	  taken	  place,	  and	  risks	  understating	  their	  importance12.	  	  
	   Despite	  these	  limitations,	  a	  great	  many	  arguments	  are	  reported	  in	  this	  literature,	  starting	  
from	  Confucius	  himself	  who	  sometimes	  uses	  clever	  syllogisms	  to	  persuade	  his	  disciples	  of	  
counterintuitive	  conclusions	  (see	  for	  instance	  Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  270).	  The	  following	  growth	  of	  
Confucianism	  should	  be	  understood	  “in	  terms	  of	  its	  ‘reacting	  to	  criticisms	  of	  opponents,’	  and	  [we	  
should]	  see	  the	  ‘advance	  and	  changes’	  of	  any	  Chinese	  discourse	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  ‘engaging	  in	  
philosophical	  debate	  with	  rival	  doctrines.’”	  (Liu,	  1996,	  quoting	  from	  Hansen,	  1992;	  see	  Combs,	  2004	  
for	  similar	  arguments	  regarding	  Daoism).	  More	  generally,	  “there	  is	  a	  growing	  recognition	  of	  the	  
central	  role	  played	  by	  argumentation	  in	  the	  production—and	  interpretation—of	  pre-­‐Han	  texts”	  (Liu,	  
1996,	  p.33).	  Debates	  were	  also	  very	  much	  present	  in	  religious	  life:	  “From	  about	  the	  fourth	  to	  the	  
tenth	  century	  Buddhist	  monks	  in	  China	  engaged	  in	  formal,	  semi-­‐public,	  religious	  disputation”	  
(Garrett,	  1997,	  p.195).	  Debates	  between	  “Taoists,	  Confucians,	  and	  Buddhists”	  were	  taken	  very	  
seriously,	  with	  their	  looser	  being	  “defrocked,	  and	  their	  temple	  properties	  confiscated”	  (Collins,	  2002,	  
p.	  67).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  Branham	  notes	  that	  recent	  historical	  work	  has	  “revised	  the	  portrait	  of	  
Japan's	  past.	  What	  has	  emerged	  is	  not	  the	  "relatively	  peaceful"	  arhetorical	  society	  described	  by	  
Becker	  and	  others,	  but	  a	  country	  whose	  past	  three	  hundred	  years	  have	  been	  marked	  by	  great	  
ideological	  and	  often	  physical	  conflict,	  and	  whose	  disputes	  have	  often	  been	  conducted	  and	  recorded	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  debates”	  (Branham,	  1994	  see	  also	  Najita	  &	  Koschmann,	  1982).	  And,	  as	  in	  China,	  	  
“argumentative	  sermons	  and	  public	  addresses	  delivered	  by	  scholars	  to	  commoners	  were	  common	  in	  
                                                
12	  The	  transformation	  of	  long,	  sometimes	  heated	  arguments	  into	  straightforward	  positive	  proofs	  is	  also	  a	  
landmark	  of	  the	  scientific	  literature	  in	  the	  West,	  since	  its	  Galilean	  beginnings	  (see	  Zuber,	  2008	  for	  Galileo).	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pre-­‐Meiji	  Japan,	  sometimes	  delivered	  to	  crowds	  numbering	  in	  the	  thousands”	  (Branham,	  1994)13.	  Far	  
from	  abiding	  by	  their	  own	  precepts,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  scholars	  in	  China	  and	  Japan	  were	  prone	  to	  
dissention	  and	  debate.	  But	  they	  were	  in	  their	  majority	  part	  of	  a	  privileged	  elite.	  Maybe	  laypeople	  
would	  be	  more	  subservient?	  
	   “In	  Chhi	  there	  was	  a	  servant	  who	  refused	  to	  commit	  suicide	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  his	  master	  who	  
got	  into	  trouble.	  In	  the	  street	  he	  met	  an	  old	  acquaintance	  who	  said:	  ‘How	  come	  you’re	  still	  alive?’	  
	   ‘Well,	  everyone	  serves	  others	  to	  gain	  an	  advantage.	  Dying	  is	  not	  an	  advantage.	  Therefore	  I	  
refused	  to	  die.’	  
	   ‘But	  will	  you	  be	  able	  to	  face	  other	  people	  (having	  failed	  to	  commit	  the	  obligatory	  suicide)?’	  
	   ‘Well,	  do	  you	  imagine	  I	  could	  face	  them	  if	  I	  were	  dead?’”	  This	  anecdote	  collected	  by	  Lü	  Pu-­‐
Wei	  in	  the	  3rd	  century	  BCE	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  279)	  reflects	  both	  a	  clear	  lack	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  
customs	  and	  wonderfully	  ironical	  argumentative	  skills,	  all	  from	  a	  mere	  servant.	  Another	  story	  tells	  
how	  young	  boys	  were	  poking	  fun	  at	  Confucius	  himself	  for	  his	  inability	  to	  solve	  simple	  logical	  riddles	  
(Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  269).	  When	  Becker	  tries	  to	  argue	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  “throughout	  Chinese	  
history,	  there	  were	  purges	  and	  book-­‐burnings,	  when	  all	  but	  the	  few	  texts	  approved	  by	  officialdom	  
were	  destroyed,	  and	  possession	  of	  contraband	  books	  carried	  the	  death	  penalty”	  (Becker,	  1986,	  p.	  77)	  
to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  was	  no	  debate	  in	  China,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  retort	  that	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  
social	  unrest	  fueled	  by	  these	  incendiary	  books,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  for	  such	  drastic	  actions.	  
Turning	  to	  the	  present,	  we	  observe	  that	  “Almost	  10,000	  Japanese	  university	  students	  study	  debate	  
each	  year	  and	  most	  of	  them	  actually	  participate	  in	  debate	  matches.	  Next	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America,	  Japan	  has	  the	  largest	  amount	  of	  debating	  in	  the	  world.”	  (Klopf,	  1979,	  p.	  1,	  quoted	  in	  Hazen,	  
1984).	  This	  is	  hardly	  to	  be	  expected	  of	  a	  nation	  fitting	  with	  the	  description	  of	  a	  “land	  covered	  with	  
reed	  and	  rice-­‐ears,	  [where]	  they	  haven’t	  argued	  since	  the	  time	  of	  gods”	  (Kakinomoto-­‐no-­‐Hitomaro,	  
                                                
13	  This	  type	  of	  debate	  had	  its	  own	  name	  (‘rongi’),	  and	  another	  word	  for	  debate	  (‘tooron’)	  is	  attested	  in	  the	  12th	  
century	  (Inoue,	  1996).	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quoted	  in	  Nakamura,	  1964,	  p.	  539)14.	  Moreover,	  studies	  that	  have	  compared	  the	  argumentativeness	  
of	  different	  populations	  (using	  the	  scale	  developed	  by	  Infante	  &	  Rancer,	  1982)	  have	  found	  only	  minor	  
and	  inconsistent	  differences	  between	  Easterners	  and	  Westerners	  (Aune,	  Hunter,	  Kim,	  &	  Kim,	  2001;	  
Bresnahan,	  Shearman,	  Lee,	  Ohashi,	  &	  Mosher,	  2002).	  Finally,	  experiments	  on	  collaborative	  reasoning	  
show	  that	  Chinese	  and	  Korean	  children	  can	  shed	  very	  quickly	  the	  constraints	  that	  may	  be	  imposed	  
during	  interactions	  with	  teachers	  to	  become	  fierce	  arguers	  between	  themselves	  (Dong,	  Anderson,	  
Kim,	  &	  Li,	  2008).	  
	   The	  evidence	  reviewed	  above	  leaves	  little	  ground	  to	  expect	  substantial	  differences	  in	  
argumentative	  abilities	  between	  Easterners	  and	  Westerners.	  But	  even	  if	  their	  foundations	  are	  shaky,	  
cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists	  have	  built	  on	  top	  of	  them	  an	  important	  experimental	  edifice,	  to	  which	  I	  
will	  turn	  shortly,	  after	  another	  short	  historical	  digression.	  	  
4	  Cross-­‐cultural	  differences	  in	  reasoning	  and	  in	  dealing	  with	  
contradiction	  
4.1	  Dealing	  with	  contradiction	  
Among	  the	  most	  provocative	  claims	  to	  be	  used	  by	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
Chinese	  tradition	  lacks	  a	  principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction:	  “Even	  the	  highest	  authorities	  on	  logic	  in	  
China	  literally	  did	  not	  know	  what	  they	  were	  talking	  about,	  and	  frequently	  contradicted	  themselves	  
without	  being	  bothered	  by	  it!”	  (Becker,	  1986,	  p.	  84)15.	  Such	  ideas	  were	  already	  expressed	  at	  the	  
                                                
14	  It	  is	  quite	  ironical	  to	  contrast	  this	  restriction	  of	  argumentation	  to	  the	  golden	  time	  of	  the	  Gods	  in	  Japan	  with	  
the	  opposite	  stance	  taken	  by	  some	  Jewish	  scholars,	  according	  to	  whom	  “Initially	  there	  was	  no	  controversy	  in	  
Israel”	  (Tosefta	  Sanhedrin	  7:1	  quoted	  in	  Ben-­‐Menahem,	  2007,	  p.	  49).	  Should	  one	  conclude	  that	  argumentation	  
is	  seen	  in	  a	  better	  light	  in	  Japanese	  than	  in	  Jewish	  culture?	  Obviously	  not,	  but	  this	  goes	  on	  to	  show	  that	  by	  
using	  quotes	  one	  can	  cherry	  pick	  his	  way	  to	  more	  or	  less	  any	  conclusion.	  
15	  If	  this	  were	  true,	  they	  would	  be	  sharing	  this	  trait	  with	  Lévy-­‐Bruhl’s	  ‘prelogical’	  people,	  whose	  thought	  “does	  
not	  bind	  itself	  down	  as	  our	  thought	  does,	  to	  avoiding	  contradictions”	  (Levy-­‐Bruhl,	  1910,	  p	  .63).	  In	  fact	  some	  of	  
these	  ‘prelogical’	  people	  (Neo-­‐Zealanders	  in	  this	  case)	  were	  in	  fact	  keen	  on	  spotting	  any	  inconsistency	  between	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beginning	  of	  the	  20th	  century;	  according	  to	  Marcel	  Granet,	  “the	  principle	  of	  contradiction	  does	  not	  
preoccupy	  the	  Chinese”	  (Granet,	  1934,	  p.	  385,	  quoted	  in	  Harbsmeier,	  1998).	  Such	  grand	  claims	  are	  
contradicted	  by	  a	  wealth	  of	  historical	  evidence.	  Chinese	  philosophers	  were	  wont	  of	  pointing	  out	  
internal	  contradictions	  and	  saw	  it	  as	  very	  serious	  problem,	  starting	  with	  Mo	  Zi,	  for	  whom	  “It’s	  
impossible	  that	  both	  sides’	  claim	  are	  right”	  (quoted	  in	  Chang,	  2007,	  p.	  93).	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  
Mohism	  is	  in	  this	  respect	  an	  exception,	  but	  that	  would	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  Confucian	  statements	  as	  
“to	  whish	  something	  to	  live	  and	  (at	  the	  same	  time)	  to	  wish	  it	  to	  die	  is	  confused”	  (quoted	  in	  
Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  214).	  Chinese	  scholars	  also	  used	  contradictions	  between	  words	  and	  deeds,	  
between	  statements,	  or	  between	  actions	  as	  rhetorical	  weapons	  against	  their	  opponent’s	  position16,	  
and	  they	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  reply	  when	  caught	  uttering	  such	  contradictory	  statements	  
(Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  213ff;	  see	  also	  Leslie,	  1964).	  
	   It	  would	  also	  be	  easy	  to	  find	  plenty	  of	  statements	  in	  the	  Western	  tradition	  denying	  the	  
importance	  of	  contradiction.	  To	  give	  but	  one	  example,	  here	  is	  Tertulian:	  “The	  son	  of	  God	  is	  dead:	  this	  
is	  to	  be	  believed	  since	  it	  is	  absurd.	  Having	  been	  buried	  he	  rose	  again:	  this	  is	  certain,	  since	  it	  is	  
impossible”	  (quoted	  in	  Lloyd,	  1990,	  p.24,	  see	  Ben-­‐Menahem,	  2007,	  p.	  25	  for	  an	  instance	  in	  Jewish	  
scholarship).	  In	  any	  case	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  such	  statements,	  Eastern	  or	  Western,	  
would	  not	  detract	  people	  from	  an	  intuitive	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction.	  As	  Lloyd	  
says:	  “When	  Aristotle	  first	  formulated	  the	  principles	  of	  non-­‐contradiction	  and	  of	  excluded	  middle,	  he	  
evidently	  aimed	  to	  make	  explicit	  rules	  that	  are	  implicit	  in	  all	  human	  communication,	  the	  rules,	  
indeed,	  that	  state	  the	  conditions	  of	  intelligible	  communication”	  (Lloyd,	  1990,	  p.	  86).	  While	  not	  
                                                                                                                                                   
the	  conduct	  of	  missionaries	  and	  their	  preaching,	  so	  that	  they	  could	  use	  these	  flaws	  as	  weapons	  to	  resist	  their	  
influence	  (Brown,	  quoted	  in	  Leroy,	  1927,	  p.	  67).	  
16	  For	  instance,	  one	  wishes	  that	  modern	  consumers	  were	  as	  savvy	  as	  this	  skeptical	  Chinese	  man	  from	  the	  3rd	  
century	  BCE:	  “Once	  there	  was	  a	  man	  of	  Ch`u	  selling	  shields	  and	  halberds.	  In	  praising	  his	  shields	  he	  said,	  "My	  
shields	  are	  so	  solid	  that	  nothing	  can	  penetrate	  them."	  Again,	  in	  praising	  his	  halberds,	  he	  said,	  "My	  halberds	  are	  
so	  sharp	  that	  they	  can	  penetrate	  anything."	  In	  response	  to	  his	  words	  somebody	  asked,	  "How	  about	  using	  your	  
halberds	  to	  pierce	  through	  your	  shields?"	  To	  this	  the	  man	  could	  not	  give	  any	  reply.	  Indeed,	  impenetrable	  
shields	  and	  absolutely	  penetrative	  halberds	  cannot	  stand	  together	  at	  the	  same	  time.”	  (Han	  Fei	  Tzu	  36.4.33,	  
quoted	  in	  Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  215)	  (in	  fact,	  this	  very	  argument	  is	  used	  as	  an	  analogy	  to	  make	  a	  related	  point,	  
another	  display	  of	  Han	  Fei	  Tzu’s	  remarkable	  argumentative	  skills).	  
22 
 
denying	  that	  Easterners	  can	  use	  this	  principle,	  Peng	  and	  Nisbett	  still	  state	  that	  Chinese	  thought	  tends	  
to	  obey	  a	  “principle	  of	  contradiction”	  according	  to	  which	  “reality	  is	  not	  precise	  or	  cut-­‐and-­‐dried	  but	  is	  
full	  of	  contradictions”	  (Peng	  &	  Nisbett,	  1999,	  p.	  743).	  They	  conclude	  their	  work	  by	  saying	  that	  “there	  
are	  two	  very	  different	  cognitive	  traditions	  in	  East	  and	  West	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  seeming	  
contradictions.	  The	  differences	  we	  have	  found,	  it	  should	  be	  noted,	  are	  actual	  qualitative	  ones”	  (Peng	  
&	  Nisbett,	  1999,	  p.	  750).	  It	  is	  these	  differences	  that	  I	  will	  now	  examine	  (see	  S.	  F.	  Chan,	  2000;	  Ho,	  
2000;	  Huss,	  2004;	  Lee,	  2000	  for	  other	  critiques	  of	  these	  experiments	  and	  their	  interpretation).	  
	   A	  tendency	  to	  overlook	  contradictions	  could	  be	  apparent	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  social	  
conflicts17.	  Whereas	  the	  analytic	  Americans	  should	  focus	  on	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  conflict,	  holistic	  
Chinese	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  both	  points	  of	  view	  and	  seek	  a	  middle	  way.	  Peng	  and	  
Nisbett	  presented	  two	  conflict	  situations	  to	  their	  participants,	  a	  mother-­‐daughter	  conflict	  and	  a	  
school-­‐fun	  conflict,	  and	  ask	  them	  what	  kind	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  they	  would	  favor.	  Having	  coded	  the	  
answers	  that	  tried	  to	  take	  both	  sides	  into	  account	  as	  dialectical,	  they	  observed	  an	  important	  
difference:	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  many	  Chinese	  than	  American	  participants	  gave	  such	  dialectal	  
answers.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  explain	  this	  finding	  through	  potential	  cultural	  differences	  that	  are	  
not	  directly	  related	  to	  contradiction.	  Given	  the	  content	  of	  the	  problems	  used	  it	  is	  not	  too	  farfetched	  
to	  imagine	  that	  Chinese	  participants	  were	  more	  inclined	  to	  consider	  not	  only	  the	  daughter’s	  point	  of	  
view,	  but	  also	  the	  mother’s	  (because,	  for	  instance,	  of	  their	  more	  collectivistic	  culture	  and	  the	  respect	  
of	  family	  values	  it	  entails).	  Likewise,	  seeing	  the	  necessity	  of	  working	  hard	  even	  if	  it	  implies	  missing	  
some	  fun	  might	  be	  easier	  for	  Chinese	  participants	  given	  the	  stress	  put	  on	  school	  performance.	  
Moreover,	  any	  difference	  in	  the	  perceived	  relevance	  of	  the	  conflict	  situation	  can	  bring	  about	  similar	  
results	  inside	  a	  given	  culture	  (Frantz	  &	  Seburn,	  2003).	  And	  when	  Eastern	  (Japanese)	  participants	  have	  
a	  direct	  stake	  in	  the	  contradiction	  (someone	  is	  stating	  a	  view	  point	  opposite	  their	  own),	  they	  behave	  
exactly	  as	  Westerners	  (French)	  participants,	  favoring	  their	  own	  position	  (Mercier,	  Van	  der	  Henst,	  
                                                
17	  The	  first	  two	  experiments	  dealt	  with	  preferences	  for	  dialectical	  or	  non-­‐dialectical	  proverbs.	  The	  difference	  
that	  was	  observed	  in	  Peng	  &	  Nisbett	  (1999),	  however,	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  confound,	  and	  has	  proven	  
hard	  to	  replicate	  (Friedman,	  Chen,	  &	  Vaid,	  2006).	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Yama,	  Kawasaki,	  &	  Adachi,	  submitted;	  Van	  der	  Henst,	  Mercier,	  Yama,	  Kawasaki,	  &	  Adachi,	  2007).	  So	  
generalizing	  from	  these	  two,	  arguably	  very	  tendentious,	  examples	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  warranted,	  
especially	  as	  “cultural	  group	  differences	  in	  conflict	  style	  have	  not	  always	  replicated	  across	  studies;	  
high	  within-­‐group	  variance	  often	  swamps	  between-­‐group	  variance”	  (Fu	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.191).	  	  
	   A	  similar	  criticism	  can	  apply	  to	  another	  experiment	  in	  which	  participants	  had	  to	  evaluate	  the	  
persuasiveness	  of	  four	  arguments,	  two	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  and	  two	  regarding	  the	  Aristotelian	  
assumptions	  that	  objects	  of	  different	  weights	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  ground	  at	  different	  speeds.	  One	  of	  each	  
argument	  pair	  was	  ‘logical’	  whereas	  the	  other	  was	  ‘dialectical’.	  It	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  quibble	  with	  
these	  characterizations	  (how	  logical	  can	  a	  proof	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  be?18),	  but	  the	  main	  problem	  
is	  again	  one	  of	  generalization.	  It	  takes	  a	  huge	  inductive	  leap	  to	  conclude	  from	  these	  two	  topics,	  full	  of	  
different	  cultural	  undertones,	  to	  general	  tendencies	  to	  deal	  with	  contradiction.	  	  
In	  their	  last	  experiment	  Peng	  and	  Nisbett	  asked	  their	  participants	  to	  rate	  contradictory	  
statements	  either	  in	  pair	  or	  in	  isolation.	  Here	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  statements	  they	  used:	  ”A	  social	  
psychologist	  studied	  young	  adults	  and	  asserted	  that	  those	  who	  feel	  close	  to	  their	  families	  have	  more	  
satisfying	  social	  relationships”;	  which	  was	  paired	  with:“A	  developmental	  psychologist	  studied	  
adolescent	  children	  and	  asserted	  that	  those	  children	  who	  were	  less	  dependent	  on	  their	  parents	  and	  
had	  weaker	  family	  ties	  were	  generally	  more	  mature”.	  The	  American	  participants	  tended	  to	  judge	  the	  
stronger	  of	  the	  two	  statements,	  as	  judged	  in	  isolation,	  as	  being	  stronger	  when	  the	  two	  were	  
presented	  together,	  increasing	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ratings	  of	  the	  two	  statements.	  The	  
Chinese	  participants	  behaved	  in	  the	  opposite	  manner,	  boosting	  the	  ratings	  of	  the	  weaker	  statement,	  
so	  that	  the	  ratings	  of	  the	  two	  statements	  did	  not	  differ	  when	  they	  were	  presented	  together.	  From	  
these	  results,	  Peng	  and	  Nisbett	  conclude	  that,	  when	  presented	  with	  a	  blatant	  contradiction,	  the	  
                                                
18	  For	  instance	  Huss	  (2004)	  points	  out	  that	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  God	  that	  is	  favored	  by	  Westerners	  
in	  this	  experiment,	  because	  of	  its	  apparently	  logical	  form,	  contains	  a	  blatant	  contradiction	  between	  premises	  
and	  conclusion.	  This	  contradiction	  is	  nonetheless	  ignored	  by	  the	  Westerners	  who	  are	  supposed	  to	  stake	  so	  
much	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐contradiction.	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Americans	  participants	  pinched	  resolutely	  with	  one	  side	  whereas	  the	  Chinese	  participants	  choose	  to	  
remove	  all	  difference	  by	  rating	  the	  two	  sides	  equally	  well.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  however	  to	  offer	  another	  interpretation	  for	  these	  findings.	  A	  large	  amount	  of	  
evidence	  points	  towards	  the	  existence	  of	  two	  ways	  to	  evaluate	  arguments:	  a	  peripheral	  route	  that	  
relies	  on	  simple	  cues	  and	  a	  central	  route	  that	  involves	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  arguments	  
(Chen	  &	  Chaiken,	  1999;	  Petty	  &	  Wegener,	  1999).	  When	  faced	  with	  the	  contradictory	  arguments,	  
participants	  can	  engage	  in	  either	  of	  the	  two	  evaluative	  routes	  (there	  is	  much	  less	  to	  evaluate	  when	  
the	  arguments	  are	  presented	  in	  isolation).	  Those	  participants	  who	  use	  the	  peripheral	  route	  are	  going	  
to	  rely	  on	  cues	  such	  as	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  sources.	  If,	  then,	  they	  judge	  their	  authority	  to	  be	  similar	  
(a	  developmental	  vs.	  a	  social	  psychologist	  for	  instance),	  they	  will	  award	  the	  same	  ratings	  to	  both	  
statements.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  those	  who	  use	  the	  central	  route	  will	  examine	  the	  arguments	  more	  
deeply,	  which	  may	  very	  well	  lead	  them	  to	  realize	  that	  one	  has	  more	  intrinsic	  value	  than	  the	  other.	  It	  
is	  well	  established	  that	  the	  main	  factor	  pushing	  towards	  either	  one	  of	  these	  routes	  is	  the	  personal	  
relevance	  of	  the	  arguments	  being	  evaluated	  (Petty	  &	  Wegener,	  1998).	  It	  is	  therefore	  possible	  to	  
account	  for	  Peng	  and	  Nisbett’s	  finding	  by	  another,	  less	  relevant	  cultural	  difference:	  these	  very	  results	  
should	  be	  obtained	  if	  the	  topics	  chosen	  were	  less	  relevant	  for	  the	  Chinese	  than	  for	  the	  American	  
participants.	  Some	  preliminary	  empirical	  evidence	  favoring	  this	  interpretation	  has	  been	  gathered.	  By	  
varying	  the	  degree	  of	  interest	  for	  the	  topics,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  have	  Western	  participants	  behave	  in	  a	  
‘Chinese’	  manner	  (rating	  both	  statements	  equally	  only	  when	  presented	  together)	  and	  Chinese	  
participants	  behave	  in	  an	  ‘Western’	  manner	  (increasing	  the	  ratings	  of	  the	  stronger	  of	  the	  two	  
statements	  presented	  together	  Van	  der	  Henst,	  Mercier,	  Zhang,	  Qu,	  &	  Lu,	  In	  prep).	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  another	  piece	  of	  data	  that	  is	  cited	  in	  support	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  Chinese	  deal	  differently	  with	  contradiction.	  According	  to	  Peng	  and	  Nisbett,	  “there	  is	  very	  little	  
emphasis	  on	  constructing	  counter-­‐arguments	  in	  the	  Asian	  tradition	  …	  Instead,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  
finding	  "the	  middle	  way"”.	  Interestingly,	  the	  experiments	  they	  cite	  as	  supporting	  this	  claims	  actually	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support	  a	  rather	  different	  conclusion,	  much	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  view	  defended	  here.	  Yates	  and	  his	  
collaborators	  have	  observed	  that	  Chinese	  participants	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  overconfident	  than	  their	  
American	  counterparts	  (Yates,	  Lee,	  &	  Bush,	  1997).	  Such	  overconfidence	  stems	  at	  least	  in	  part	  from	  
the	  common	  tendency,	  once	  an	  answer	  as	  been	  reached,	  to	  only	  find	  supporting	  evidence,	  thereby	  
artificially	  boosting	  confidence	  (Hoch,	  1985;	  Koriat,	  Lichtenstein,	  &	  Fischhoff,	  1980).	  According	  to	  
Yates	  et	  al.,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  even	  more	  prone	  to	  this	  bias	  than	  Westerners19.	  Far	  from	  making	  these	  
Chinese	  participants	  find	  a	  ‘middle	  way’	  however,	  this	  will	  only	  make	  them	  swerve	  towards	  their	  
initial	  opinion	  even	  more,	  when	  counter-­‐arguments	  could	  have	  led	  them	  to	  a	  more	  balanced	  
evaluation.	  Moreover,	  in	  other	  circumstances	  Easterners	  (Japanese	  students)	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  
more	  at	  ease	  criticizing	  other	  people’s	  positions	  than	  Americans	  (Hazen,	  1984).	  
	   Even	  though	  the	  ability	  to	  detect	  and	  react	  appropriately	  to	  contradiction	  may	  not	  be	  a	  part	  
of	  reasoning	  itself,	  it	  still	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  any	  argumentative	  activity.	  Argumentation	  is	  
typically	  triggered	  by	  a	  contradiction,	  and	  many	  arguments	  play	  on	  the	  internal	  contradiction	  
between	  the	  interlocutor’s	  statements.	  It	  was	  therefore	  important	  to	  show	  that,	  if	  there	  is	  any	  
difference	  in	  the	  way	  Easterners	  and	  Westerners	  deal	  with	  contradiction,	  it	  is	  rather	  superficial	  and,	  
more	  importantly,	  that	  Easterners	  are	  well	  able	  to	  make	  a	  sound	  argumentative	  use	  of	  
contradictions.	  
4.2	  Holistic	  and	  analytic	  thinking	  
While	  different	  areas	  of	  social	  and	  cognitive	  psychology	  were	  converging	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  
two	  systems	  of	  thoughts,	  cross-­‐cultural	  psychologists	  were	  elaborating	  the	  related	  division	  between	  
holistic	  and	  analytic	  thinking	  that	  has	  been	  mentioned	  earlier	  in	  this	  article.	  If	  cross-­‐cultural	  
                                                
19	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Westerners	  are	  already	  heavily	  biased	  and	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  generate	  counter-­‐
arguments	  against	  their	  own	  claims	  (see	  Kuhn,	  1991	  for	  instance),	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  “A	  good	  part	  of	  
Western	  education	  in	  fact	  consists	  of	  teaching	  children	  how	  to	  generate	  arguments	  and	  counter-­‐arguments	  
concerning	  a	  given	  position”	  (Peng	  &	  Nisbett,	  1999,	  p.	  750,	  see	  Kim,	  2003	  and	  Dong	  et	  al.,	  2008 for	  a	  more	  
evenhanded	  position	  regarding	  Confucian	  inspired	  education).	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psychologists	  recognize	  that	  all	  people	  are	  “likely	  to	  possess	  both	  of	  these	  reasoning	  systems”	  
(Norenzayan,	  Nisbett,	  Smith,	  &	  Kim,	  2000,	  p.	  654),	  they	  still	  claim	  that	  people	  reason	  in	  “qualitatively	  
different	  ways”	  (Nisbett	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  p.	  305).	  Specifically,	  they	  assert	  that	  Easterners	  tend	  to	  scorn	  
analytic	  thinking	  and	  rely	  much	  more	  heavily	  on	  intuitive	  thinking.	  For	  the	  theory	  defended	  here	  
however,	  reasoning	  (system	  2,	  analytic	  reasoning),	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  style	  of	  thinking	  but	  an	  essential	  
ingredient	  of	  human	  psychology.	  For	  a	  culture	  to	  renounce	  extensive	  use	  of	  reasoning	  would	  be	  like	  
deciding	  to	  talk	  only	  very	  rarely:	  something	  not	  impossible	  maybe,	  but	  very	  unlikely	  to	  be	  sustained	  
for	  a	  large	  population	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time.	  I	  am	  going	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  use	  of	  
reasoning	  is	  much	  more	  influenced	  by	  the	  immediate	  context	  than	  by	  deep	  seated	  differences	  
between	  Easterners	  and	  Westerners.	  This	  suggestion	  is	  in	  line	  both	  with	  a	  wealth	  of	  recent	  work	  in	  
cross-­‐cultural	  psychology	  studying	  “culture	  as	  situated	  cognition”	  (Oyserman	  &	  Lee,	  2007),	  as	  well	  
with	  Lloyd’s	  idea,	  based	  on	  historical	  analyses,	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  context	  instead	  of	  mentalities	  
(Lloyd,	  1990).	  
	   Ara	  Norenzayan	  has	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  that	  aim	  at	  showing	  that	  Easterners	  
favor	  intuitive	  thinking	  whereas	  Americans	  favor	  analytic	  thinking	  (Norenzayan	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  While	  
less	  subject	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  generalizing	  from	  a	  few	  examples,	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	  point	  out	  a	  few	  
limitations	  in	  the	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  data.	  First,	  Norenzayan	  is	  the	  first	  to	  
acknowledge	  that	  there	  are	  no	  “differences	  in	  logical	  ability”	  between	  his	  participants	  (Norenzayan	  
et	  al.,	  2000,	  p.	  678).	  That	  is,	  when	  the	  experiment	  does	  not	  pit	  intuitions	  against	  reasoning,	  
Easterners	  and	  American	  participants	  perform	  equally	  well	  (or	  equally	  poorly).	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  
notice	  that	  some	  of	  the	  differences	  obtained	  (Study	  2)	  are	  more	  easily	  interpreted	  as	  an	  over-­‐use	  of	  
rules	  by	  the	  Americans	  than	  an	  over-­‐use	  of	  intuition	  by	  Easterners20.	  And	  one	  can	  easily	  imagine	  that	  
the	  content	  of	  the	  problems	  used,	  rather	  than	  any	  general	  difference	  in	  cognitive	  style,	  may	  have	  
                                                
20	  Given	  the	  task	  at	  hand,	  the	  use	  of	  rules	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  much	  slower	  a	  more	  effortful	  than	  that	  of	  intuition,	  
for	  no	  obvious	  benefits.	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played	  a	  role	  at	  least	  in	  one	  experiment	  (Study	  4,	  in	  which	  a	  difference	  was	  obtained	  only	  for	  a	  
subtype	  of	  arguments,	  see	  also	  Unsworth	  &	  Medin,	  2005	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  experiment).	  	  
Despite	  these	  potential	  shortcomings,	  several	  results	  point	  to	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  
use	  of	  intuition	  and	  reasoning	  by	  Easterners	  and	  Americans.	  One	  of	  these	  results,	  however,	  is	  very	  
telling	  as	  to	  the	  relative	  superficiality	  of	  this	  difference.	  In	  the	  third	  study	  the	  manipulation	  was	  made	  
salient	  only	  in	  one	  half	  of	  the	  experiment.	  When	  this	  was	  the	  case,	  the	  Korean	  participants	  behave	  in	  
the	  same	  manner	  as	  the	  American	  participants,	  showing	  that	  a	  little	  nudge	  can	  undo	  any	  difference	  
otherwise	  observable.	  Other	  researchers	  stumbled	  upon	  another	  telling	  result	  while	  carrying	  out	  
similar	  experiments.	  The	  problem	  they	  used	  could	  be	  solved	  either	  inductively	  (a	  process	  closer	  to	  
intuitions)	  or	  deductively	  (requiring	  reasoning)	  (Louis	  Lee	  &	  Johnson-­‐Laird,	  2006).	  First	  they	  observed	  
absolutely	  no	  difference	  among	  their	  Chinese	  and	  American	  participants	  in	  the	  preference	  for	  one	  
type	  of	  solution.	  But	  they	  also	  observed	  that	  both	  groups	  of	  participants	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  
suggest	  a	  deductive	  solution	  when	  they	  were	  answering	  the	  problem	  right	  after	  they	  have	  had	  to	  
solve	  unrelated	  deductive	  problems.	  Other	  results	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  relative	  use	  being	  made	  of	  
intuitions	  and	  reasoning	  can	  be	  easily	  influenced,	  within	  a	  given	  population,	  by	  varying	  the	  
processing	  goals	  or	  through	  priming	  techniques	  (Ferreira,	  Garcia-­‐Marques,	  Sherman,	  &	  Sherman,	  
2006).	  
From	  these	  results,	  it	  seems	  quite	  clear	  that	  Easterners	  are	  as	  able	  as	  Westerners	  of	  ‘analytic’	  
thought	  and	  that	  the	  use	  of	  intuition	  or	  reasoning	  can	  easily	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  immediate	  context	  
in	  any	  population,	  a	  conclusion	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  the	  work	  mentioned	  earlier	  about	  illiterate	  
populations.	  This	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  given	  the	  strong	  effects	  simple	  primes	  can	  have	  on	  
‘cultural’	  cognitive	  differences,	  from	  perception	  to	  high	  level	  cognition	  (see	  Oyserman	  &	  Lee,	  2008	  
for	  review).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  parts	  of	  ‘analytic’	  cognition	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  carried	  out	  by	  
intuitive	  processes	  and	  that	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  what	  is	  usually	  called	  ‘holistic’	  cognition	  may	  stem	  from	  
superficial	  variation	  in	  a	  similar	  reasoning	  system	  (see	  Buchtel	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2009	  for	  a	  reflection	  on	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the	  differences	  between	  the	  intuition	  -­‐	  reasoning	  and	  holistic	  -­‐	  analytic	  distinction).	  Some	  differences	  
between	  ‘holistic’	  and	  ‘analytic’	  thinking	  have	  more	  to	  do	  with	  a	  preferred	  style	  of	  argument	  than	  
with	  reasoning	  ability	  per	  se—a	  point	  that	  will	  be	  elaborated	  on	  presently.	  
5	  Conclusion	  	  
The	  main	  claim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  people	  everywhere,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  language	  or	  culture,	  can	  
and	  do	  argue,	  even	  if	  this	  requires	  abstract	  reasoning.	  This	  may	  seem	  rather	  obvious,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  a	  
point	  worth	  making	  in	  light	  of	  the	  strong	  claims	  that	  have	  been	  made	  about	  either	  illiterate	  
populations	  or	  East	  Asian	  cultures.	  In	  particular,	  what	  can	  we	  conclude	  from	  the	  research	  program	  of	  
Nisbett	  and	  collaborators	  regarding	  skills	  related	  to	  argumentation?	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  historical	  and	  
sociological	  claims	  on	  which	  they	  base	  their	  theories	  represent	  of	  rather	  rough	  grained	  perception	  of	  
the	  differences	  between	  Easterner	  and	  Westerner	  culture;	  one	  that	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  rendered	  
somewhat	  dated.	  It	  is	  possible,	  however,	  to	  draw	  from	  this	  literature	  a	  view	  of	  finer	  grained	  
differences:	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  arguments	  are	  used	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  use	  of	  argumentation	  per	  
se.	  In	  any	  case,	  these	  criticisms	  certainly	  do	  not	  warrant	  a	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  the	  research	  
program	  and	  its	  many	  empirical	  results,	  which	  present	  an	  impressive	  and	  coherent	  whole	  with	  some	  
very	  robust	  results.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  more	  interesting	  to	  point	  out	  the	  dangers	  of.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  
attempt	  a	  reinterpretation,	  which	  could	  possibly	  be	  done	  along	  the	  lines	  that	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  
presently.	  
	   One	  of	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  that	  when	  reasoning	  is	  used	  in	  
decision-­‐making,	  it	  should	  push	  people	  towards	  decisions	  that	  are	  easy	  to	  justify,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  
better.	  This	  fits	  well	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  reason	  based	  choice	  that	  has	  provided	  a	  similar	  account	  
of	  many	  decision-­‐making	  phenomena	  (see	  Shafir,	  Simonson,	  &	  Tversky,	  1993).	  Most	  relevant	  here	  is	  
an	  experiment	  that	  varied	  not	  only	  the	  use	  of	  reasoning,	  but	  also	  the	  cultural	  origin	  of	  the	  
participants	  (Americans	  and	  East	  Asians)	  (Briley,	  Morris,	  &	  Simonson,	  2000).	  Participants	  had	  to	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choose	  one	  item	  among	  a	  set	  of	  three,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  a	  compromise	  option	  while	  the	  other	  two	  
were	  more	  ‘extreme’	  (much	  stronger	  on	  an	  attribute	  but	  much	  weaker	  on	  another).	  In	  a	  control	  
condition,	  no	  difference	  was	  observed	  between	  American	  participants	  and	  participants	  from	  Honk	  
Kong.	  However,	  when	  the	  participants	  had	  to	  provide	  reasons	  for	  their	  choices—when	  they	  had	  to	  
reason	  more—a	  difference	  appeared:	  Americans	  started	  to	  choose	  the	  extreme	  more	  often	  while	  
participants	  from	  Honk	  Kong	  tended	  to	  favor	  the	  compromise	  option.	  These	  new	  choices	  are	  more	  in	  
line	  with	  the	  hypothesized	  cultural	  values	  of	  the	  two	  groups,	  and	  indeed	  the	  answers	  were	  mediated	  
by	  the	  content	  of	  the	  reasons	  given.	  This	  raises	  an	  interesting	  quandary	  because	  in	  this	  case	  more	  
reasoning	  led	  the	  East	  Asian	  participants	  towards	  an	  answer	  that	  might	  otherwise	  have	  been	  
qualified	  of	  being	  more	  ‘holistic’	  (taking	  all	  the	  attributes	  into	  account).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  
exactly	  what	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  if	  reasoning	  drives	  people	  towards	  easy	  to	  justify	  answers:	  what	  
makes	  for	  a	  good	  justification	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  context,	  including	  the	  cultural	  context.	  
	   Besides	  these	  differences	  in	  the	  content	  of	  the	  justifications	  that	  reasoning	  will	  find	  more	  
appropriate,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  think	  that	  culture	  could	  influence	  the	  way	  reasoning	  looks	  for	  
arguments.	  When	  engaged	  in	  a	  debate,	  there	  are	  two	  broad	  strategies	  that	  can	  be	  followed:	  
bolstering	  one’s	  claims,	  or	  attacking	  those	  of	  the	  interlocutor.	  Lloyd	  claims	  that	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  
relied	  more	  on	  the	  former	  while	  the	  Chinese	  preferred	  the	  later:	  “The	  Chinese	  too,	  of	  course,	  prized	  
arguments	  that	  defeated	  those	  of	  their	  opponents,	  but	  they	  did	  so	  mainly	  by	  showing	  the	  weakness	  
of	  their	  opponents’	  positions	  directly,	  not	  by	  claiming	  that	  their	  own	  were	  unassailable	  thanks	  to	  
their	  logical	  structure”	  (Lloyd,	  2006	  p.	  167).	  Such	  differences	  may	  emerge	  because	  of	  the	  way	  
different	  types	  of	  arguments	  are	  perceived.	  Maybe	  dwelling	  too	  much	  on	  one’s	  own	  arguments	  
would	  have	  been	  perceived	  as	  arrogant	  in	  ancient	  China?	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  to	  learn	  what	  kind	  of	  
arguments	  will	  be	  better	  received	  in	  a	  given	  environment	  and	  to	  adjust	  the	  way	  we	  look	  for	  them	  
accordingly.	  It	  is	  therefore	  likely	  that	  cultural	  differences	  will	  emerge	  in	  this	  respect	  as	  well.	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   The	  argumentative	  theory	  sees	  reasoning	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  social	  ability.	  It	  is	  but	  one	  of	  the	  
many	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  that	  we	  use	  to	  make	  the	  best	  of	  our	  social	  environment.	  In	  this	  
framework,	  reasoning	  should	  be	  partly	  substitutable	  with	  other	  mechanisms	  of	  social	  influence.	  For	  
instance,	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  find	  elaborate	  arguments	  with	  a	  strong	  internal	  logic,	  one	  can	  instead	  
focus	  on	  the	  mental	  states	  of	  the	  interlocutor,	  trying	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  kind	  of	  argument	  will	  be	  
more	  effective.	  The	  skills	  required	  to	  do	  that	  will	  be	  closer	  to	  mentalization	  (theory	  of	  mind)	  than	  to	  
reasoning.	  So	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  expect	  cultural	  variation	  not	  only	  in	  the	  way	  reasoning	  itself	  is	  used,	  but	  
also	  in	  the	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  different	  persuasion	  skills.	  Thus,	  while	  there	  may	  have	  been	  no	  
Chinese	  Cicero	  or	  Quintilian,	  “In	  imperial	  Rome	  …	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  equal	  the	  subtlety	  of	  the	  
psychological	  analysis	  in	  Hanfeizi”	  (Lloyd,	  2007,	  p.	  10).	  	  
The	  Eastern	  and	  the	  Western	  traditions	  differ	  not	  only	  in	  the	  way	  they	  use	  reasoning,	  but	  
also	  in	  the	  way	  they	  perceive	  it	  (a	  difference	  that	  persists	  to	  this	  day	  Buchtel	  &	  Norenzayan,	  2008).	  I	  
surmise	  that	  the	  Greek	  influence	  has	  (also)	  had	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  reasoning.	  
By	  seeing	  reasoning	  and	  logic	  as	  tools	  primarily	  designed	  for	  individual	  epistemic	  improvement,	  the	  
Greeks	  may	  have	  bequeathed	  upon	  their	  intellectual	  heirs	  a	  rather	  flawed	  conception21.	  Maybe	  the	  
more	  pragmatic	  Chinese	  were	  right,	  for	  whom	  arguments	  “are	  in	  general	  designed	  not	  to	  prove	  …	  
but	  to	  convince”	  (Harbsmeier,	  1998,	  p.	  265).	  
	  
                                                
21	  Ironically	  enough,	  Lloyd	  suggests	  that	  this	  very	  notion	  was	  born	  out	  of	  argumentative	  pressures	  (Lloyd,	  1990,	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